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CHAPTER ELEVEN
OPTIMAL GRAIN PRICING AND STORAGE POLICY IN CONTROLLED 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIES: APPLICATION TO ZIMBABWE
Steve Buccola and Chrispen Sukume 
INTRODUCTION
Increased emphasis on food security in developing countries has 
heightened attention to domestic pricing and grain stock policies. 
Analysts frequently have concluded that consumer and producer prices 
in controlled agricultural markets tend to be too low, although 
Jabara has argued this is not the case for producer prices in Kenya 
(Adoyade; Pollard and Graham). Governments of middle-income 
countries also have been blamed for holding excessively high food 
and cash crop stocks (Bale, pp. 32-4).
To argue that agricultural policies consistently are in error, 
one must hold either that policy makers optimize poorly, use biased 
supply and demand forecasts, or pursue objectives different from 
those the analyst thinks important. Of these three, it usually is 
most fruitful to consider the diverse objectives that governments 
and other economic groups pursue when setting or influencing 
policy. Producers' interest in high farm prices and consumers' 
interest in low retail prices are well known. Much less understood 
are the high risks and conflicting demands faced by those 
governments which have concentrated pricing, storage, and trade 
decisions in the public sector. Analysis of these risks and 
conflicts not only helps explain current policies but provides a 
better idea of desirable policy adjustments.
In this chapter we consider a government marketing board that 
dominates farm grain purchases, sales to commercial millers, and 
external grain trade. Government regulates or heavily influences
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most agricultural input and product prices at all levels of 
marketing chain. It also maintains most of the nation's grain 
reserve stocks. This institutional setting is found commonly in 
Africa and, to a slightly lesser extent, in Asia and Latin 
America (Ahmed and Rustagi, Aboyade). Since unexpected changes 
in net domestic supplies must be balanced by changes in the 
board's stocks or external trade, the arrangement imposes on 
government much of the food industry's financial risk.
Our objective is to outline a framework for identifying 
combinations of prices and storage policies that best promote 
government's -- and to some extent society's -- welfare. Unlike 
most past studies, we avoid equating welfare with just expected 
returns or risks of 'shortfalls' (Martin and McDonald, 
Reutlinger). Rather, welfare is taken in the broader sense of 
expected utility, which considers the entire probability 
distribution of returns associated with a given policy.
Principal findings, applied to the Zimbabwe maize sector, are 
that optimal stock and price policies are interrelated. Present 
board stocks suggest an excessive willingness to gamble on 
future income. At approximately equilibrating exchange rates, 
full-cost pricing would reduce government utility and increase 
producer utility. This would create pressure for market 
decontrol.
DECISION MODEL
The approach taken is to specify a marketing board income 
equation and functions relating policy variable to domestic 
maize demands and supplies. Monte carlo methods then are used 
to estimate income probabilities and utilities of alternative 
policies.
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(a ) Marketing Board Income
The marketing board's annual maize income is determined by 
export revenue (or import cost), revenue from sales to domestic 
commercial millers, cost of farm maize purchases, storage 
costs, and handling and fixed expenses. Specifically, board 
income is
Y
(S + Qst - Q d t H pwt " Te)Xt/ d  + i) 
if (St_i + Qst - Qdt) > 0 
(St- 1  + Qst - Qdt)(pwt + Ti)Xt/(l + i) 
if (St-i + Qst “ Qdt) <  ^
export revenues (import costs) net of 
transport cost to (from) port, at time t 
+ Qdtpd / d  + (i/2)] 
domestic revenues in t 
- Qst(ps + H )/[1 + (i/4)] 
farm maize purchase and handling costs in t 
-(St-1)(I) " P
storage insurance and fixed costs in t 
“ St-i(Pw/t-1 - ^e)^t-l 
export value of stocks at t-1
(1)
where St-i = Quantity of maize carried from end of t-1 to
i, i.
end of t—  fiscal year (tons);
Qst = Quantity of maize supplied to the board by 
farmers in year t (tons);
Qdt = Quantity of maize demanded of the board by 
commercial millers in year t (tons); 
pwt, pw,t-l = World maize price at port (US$/ton);
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Te (Ti) = Transfer cost to (from) port (US$/ton);
xt' xt-l = Zimbabwe - U.S. dollar exchange rate (Zimbabwe
dollars per U.S. dollar: Z$/US$);
= sale price charged commercial millers (z$ per ton);
Ps = purchase price paid farmers (Z$/ton);
H , I - handling and storage insurance cost, respectively, 
(Z$/ton);
P = fixed cost allocated to maize account (z$); 
i = annual interest rate.
t  u
At end of the t-1 —  fiscal year, when government selects 
price Pst to pay farmers, P<jt to charge millers, and strategic
reserve stock St-i to carry into t, income Y is random.1/ 
Domestic supply response Qst, domestic demand Qdt» and hence 
net domestic supply Qst - Qdt' are Yet unknown. And although 
current world price Pw,t-1 an<^  exchange rate Xj-_i are
observable, those at future point t still are random.2/ Stocks 
carried forward from t-1 are assumed 'purchased' from the t-1 —  
fiscal year at current net world price and either are exported
i ,  r_
(or deducted from imports) at time t or 'sold' to the t+1 —  
fiscal year at net export price (Pwt - Te ). Thus, the board 
will export or import at t according as carryover plus net 
domestic supply, St-i + Qst ~ Qdt, positive or negative.
The distinction is important because to-port transfer cost T e 
may not equal from-port cost T^: imports may involve different
per-ton freight rates than exports and deny policy makers the 
prestige of having achieved 'self sufficiency.'
Board income in (1) is expressed as a present value at 
decision point t-1. Interest rates are adjusted approximately 
to reflect the fact that domestic sales are nonseasonal while
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farm purchases peak early in the second quarter. External 
trades are assumed to occur near the end of the fiscal year and 
are discounted at the full annual rate. Variable storage cost 
consists principally of the time value of export revenues (or 
import costs) received at t rather than at t-1.
If government were risk averse and knew it would be an 
exporter at t, it never would hold other than working stocks at 
t-1 unless world price were expected to rise substantially in 
the ensuing year. Stocks sold immediately at t-1 avoid 
interest charge and risk of future price and exchange rate 
changes. Because few developing countries invest in the 
information needed for successful world price speculation, they 
only would hold strategic reserves in order to reduce the ex 
ante utility cost of future imports. J3x post import costs vary 
with per-ton transportation rates and the prestige loss of 
importing. Ex ante costs vary also with government's risk 
aversion and with the probability of requiring imports, which 
in turn depend not only on carryover stocks but on domestic 
prices influencing next year's domestic demand and supply.
It makes a difference in this regard whether exchange rates 
used are official ones or those reflecting true scarcity of 
foreign exchange. Many developing countries peg their unit of 
account to a market basket of foreign currency values, which 
vary randomly. Even so, the pegging formula typically is such 
as to chronically undervalue hard currencies in the sense that 
domestic demand permanently exceeds supply. In the latter 
situation, use of an official or pegged rate in (1) would 
understate the local currency value of exports and local 
currency cost of imports. it therefore would understate 
foreign earnings risks to which government is subject and fail
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adequately to explain developing governments' distaste for 
imports. For planning purposes, it is better to employ an 
estimate of the equilibrating rather than official exchange 
rate probability distribution, even though results will diverge 
from accounting returns based on official rates.
(b ) Maize Demand and Supply
Nations with large peasant farming populations are in the 
unique position that the farm and retail price of a product 
each can affect both farm supply and retail demand. Peasant 
farmers often may choose between consuming their own grain or 
selling it and buying retail grain meal. Allocation between 
home-produced and purchased staple would depend upon relative 
producer and retail prices. In contrast, urban consumers 
respond only to retail and commercial farmers only to producer 
price. Data availability generally requires aggregating urban 
and peasant farm demand but commercial and peasant farm 
supplies may be specified separately. Letting Pr be retail 
price, Zd (Zs ) a vector of other policies affecting demand 
(supply), W random weather conditions, and e^t, eslt' es2t 
excluded random factors, demand and supply facing the board are
Qdt = Qd(p r / p sf p df Zd r e d t ) (2)
Qstpea - Qsp e a (p r/ p s> zs r w, e s l t ) (3)
Qstcom = Q s c o m (Ps , Zs , w, es;2t> (4)
where pea and com refer to peasant and commercial supply, 
respectively, and Qstpea + Qstcom = Qst*
Demand policy factors Z<j include urban wages which, 
together with price ratio Pr/PSr affect meal orders placed by 
retailers with commercial millers. Z<j also includes
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(government controlled) wholesale wheat prices, which millers 
would compare with the board's maize selling price Pd in order 
to determine volume Qdt of maize to purchase from the board. 
Random factor edt consists partly of unpredictable yield 
changes on peasant farms, since these affect demand for the 
retail substitute of home-produced maize meal. Supply policy 
vector Zs includes fertilizer and cotton prices, while esn- and 
es2t represent random factors other than weather conditions. 
Grain producer prices in Zimbabwe are announced prior to 
planting. In absence of pre-planting announcements, price 
expectations would have to be modelled with appropriate lags.
Functional forms needed to fit (2) - (4) greatly affect 
policy implications derivable from the research (Turnovsky; 
Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, pp. 244-46; Reutlinger). This is 
because form determines the manner in which policy variables 
affect both the expectation and variance of demand and supply. 
Choice of form was guided partly by theoretical considerations, 
partly by goodness of fit. Doublelog version of (2),
Qdt = AKiaedt E(edt) = 1  (2')
where Ki is policy vector (Pr, Ps , Pd , Zd ) and Kia represents 
Pra^Psa2pda3...f is the most widely recognized form of 
endogenous-quantity demand (Newbery and Stiglitz, pp. 120-1). 
Expectation and variance of demand in (2') are AK^a and 
A2Ki2aVar(edt), respectively, so coefficient of variation is 
the constant [Var(edt)]!/2. Form (2') gave lower adjusted mean 
square error than did the linear and was employed in this 
study.3/
Supplies were specified with additive errors so that 
variance could partially be independent of mean. Letting K2 be
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policy vector (Pr, Ps , Zs ), K3 be (Ps , Zs ), and using the same 
notation as in (2 '),
Qstpea = BK2bw9 + CK2c u (3')
QstCOm = DK3dw9 + PK3fV (4*)
where B, C, D , F are constants; CK2cu = esit and FK3fv = es2t; 
and E(u ) = E(v ) = 0, Var(u) = Var(v) = 1. Peasant farm supply 
(for example) has mean BK2bE(w9) and variance B2K22bVar(w9) + 
C2K22c, so its coefficient of variation is a nonconstant 
function of policy level. Forms (3'), (4') provided better fit 
than did doublelog versions/ which, like (2 '), have 
multiplicative errors.
Demand (21) was estimated with OLS and deflated 1968-85 
time series; (3') and (4') were estimated with deflated 1953-85 
data using the iterative nonlinear approach suggested by 
Buccola and McCarl. Elasticities of expected demand and supply 
with respect to stochastic and policy variables are shown in 
table 1. At first blush, a 0.81 wage income elasticity sounds 
high for a staple food. Actually, demand for commercially 
milled meal should be very wage-income-responsive since 
consumers tend to switch from home-produced to retail-purchased 
meal when moving from farms to wage employment. Producer price 
supply elasticity on commercial farms is very close to the 
(0.57) long-run wheat supply elasticity in developing countries 
estimated by Adams and Behrman (p.43). High response to 
fertilizer price underscores importance of fertilizer marketing 
policy in LDC's. Although we expected strong producer price 
response in the peasant sector, the large value estimated 
partly may result from the coincidence of rural security 
improvements, effective efforts at collective marketing, and
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Table 1. Maize expected demand and supply elasticities facing 
marketing board, Zimbabwe
Elasticity t-Value
Wholesale Demand
Wholesale Maize Price -1.50 -3.13
Wholesale Wheat Price 0.90 1.06
Retail Maize Meal Price -0.65 a/ a/
Producer Maize Price 0.65 a/ a/
Wage Income 0.81 2.43
Peasant Farm Supply
Producer Maize Price 1.87 b/ 7.97 b/
Producer Cotton Price -1.87 b/ -7.97 b/
Retail Maize Meal Price -1.75 -4.68
Tassling Season Rainfall SJ 0.88 4.88
Commercial Farm Supply
Producer Maize Price 0.55 b/ 3.04 b/
Producer Tobacco Price £./ -0.55 b/ 3.04 b/
Nitrogenous Fertilizer Price -1.10 -3.07
Tassling Season Rainfall £/ 0.62 4.21
a/ The ratio of producer to retail price was used in a doublelog 
model to forecast on-farm maize retentions, which is turn were 
used to forecast demand. Thus no direct t-values are 
available. On-farm retentions had elasticity -0.63 with 
standard error 0.20.
b/ These coefficients were constrained equal to overcome price 
collinearity.
_c/ Indicates stochastic variable. All other variables were 
regarded as determined by government policy.
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real price increases after the 1970's civil war (Bratton) .i./
On the other hand, elasticities changed little when the time 
period of fit was varied from 1953-85 to 1968-85. Lower supply 
sensitivity to rainfall in commercial than in peasant areas is 
a consequence of supplemental irrigation on commercial farms.
(c) Simulation Procedure
Equations (2') - (4') make clear that government price 
policies affect the entire probability distribution of demand 
and supply. Through (1), policies also affect the 
probabilities of marketing board income. Because the board 
avowedly is operated on behalf of citizens and losses are 
charged to the public treasury, we argue that its income should 
be considered to accrue to all individuals in society. Thus 
board incomes should be evaluated in terms of a typical 
citizen's utility function.A/ Given widespread evidence of 
risk aversion in household decisions, it is appropriate further 
to cast effects of alternative policies in terms of expected 
utilities rather than expected profits. In this sense, we 
depart from the profit maximization approach taken by Pollard 
and Graham, who in other respects provide valuable insights 
into marketing board strategy and performance.
Analytical derivation of income probability moments and 
expected utilities would be unwieldy. Export income (import 
cost) alone involves the three-way product of random world 
price and random exchange rate with both random demand and 
random supply. Monte carlo simulation therefore is used 
instead. Two thousand random values of pwt, X^, edt* eslt' and 
es2t wet® drawn for each price and storage policy considered, 
and for each drawing a value of board income Y calculated. The
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latter then were used to compute income probability densities 
and expected utilities assuming citizens have exponential 
utility.^/ Absolute risk aversion employed for this purpose 
was derived from the modal or 'intermediate' partial risk 
aversion identified in Binswanger's study of Indian peasant 
farmers. Mean incomes in that study approximate average 
incomes in Zimbabwe. Details of utility derivations and other 
simulation parameter settings are available from the authors.2/
OPTIMAL PRICES AND RESERVE STOCKS
Domestic grain and meal prices that maximize the marketing 
board's expected utility depend upon reserve stock levels since 
stocks affect impacts of price changes on the board's expected 
income and risk. For the same reason, optimal stocks depend 
upon domestic prices in force. To demonstrate this, the 
board's expected utility is calculated for each of several 
producer prices at a given stockholding and the expected- 
utility-maximum price Ps* recorded for alternative stock levels 
S. We indicate such a relationship by [S, Ps*]. In similar 
fashion, the optimal reserve stock S* is calculated at a number 
of alternative producer prices —  [Ps/ S*].
Results are shown in figure 1, where prices other than for 
producer maize are held at 1986-87 positions. If the board 
holds no stocks, its privately optimal producer price is 
Z$130/ton; the optimum falls to Z$78/ton with a million-ton 
stock. At most producer prices, optimal reserves are zero; 
that is, the board is best off exporting any year-end excess 
over (or importing just to satisfy) working stocks. At prices 
below Z$90/ton, however, the probability distribution of net 
domestic supply (Qst - Qdt) is such that there is a substantial
303
Producer Price
(1986 Z$/ton)
Figure 1. Board's optimal producer prices and reserve stocks given 
1986-87 levels of other prices, Zimbabwe.
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chance of requiring imports (St-i + Qst " Qdt < 0) if there 
were no reserves. Por example, probability of imports rises 
from 8.7% to 15.1% as producer price falls from z$100 to 
Z$80/ton when stocks are zero. This increases the desirability 
of holding stocks since stocks save round-trip transfer costs 
(Te + Ti) to port and help insulate the board from import price 
risk.il/ Reaction functions [s, Ps*l and [Ps, S*] intersect at 
point A in figure 1, indicating that zero reserves and a Z$130 
producer price are optimal overall.
Because the value of holding reserves increases with export 
and import transfer costs Te , Ti, optimal reserve [Ps , S*] 
should rise.as Te or Ti increase in real terms. Viewed ex ante 
at decision point t-1, real transfer cost is its certainty 
equivalent, which increases with the mean or variance of the 
cost probability distribution.il/ Unpredictable cost variance 
(cost risk) is especially important for a land-locked country 
like Zimbabwe, whose principal import supply routes through 
South Africa are threatened by sanctions. To reflect more 
fully the presently high risk component of import transfer 
costs, they were quadrupled over present values. Export 
transfer costs were only doubled since most exports would not 
be shipped through South Africa but would be affected by 
increased petrol and parts costs. Functions [S, PS*J and 
[Ps , S*] then were re-estimated.
Results are shown in figure 2. Relation [S, Ps*] has 
shifted down an average z$19/ton from its figure 1 level, 
reflecting the impact of lower net export prices on prices the 
rd willingly would offer producers. More significant is the 
■ift upward in the [Ps, s*] reaction function. The board now 
optimally would^ retain strategic maize reserves even with
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Producer Price
(1986 Z$/ton)
Reserve Stock (000 tons)
Figure 2. Board's optimal producer prices and reserve stocks given 
1986-87 levels of other prices and import risk premium, 
Zimbabwe.
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producer price as high as Z$150/ton. Reserves reduce the 
probability of requiring imports and thus have increased 
importance in the presence of a severe import penalty. At 
1986-87 fertilizer, maize substitute, and retail maize meal 
prices, however, chances of imports still are not high and the 
overall optimum reserve is a modest 105,000 tons (point B in 
figure 2). Optimal producer price at this stock is Z$102/ton 
(point E), down Z$28 from the low-transport-cost (figure 1) 
scenario.
Many developing countries have designed price, input 
procurement, and extension policies to promote food staple 
self-sufficiency, that is to reduce probabilities of staple 
imports. It is useful to see how maize producer price and 
storage policies best would change if Zimbabwe departed from 
this practice by setting prices of demand substitutes so as to 
increase frequency of maize purchases from abroad. This is 
done in figure 3, where wheat price charged domestic millers is 
fixed two standard deviations above its 1968-85 mean, maize 
price charged millers is at 1968-85 mean, and all other prices 
are at 1986-87 levels. Export-import transfer costs also are 
returned to 1986-87 (figure 1) levels to represent end of South 
African sanctions.
With maize demand parameters so boosted, the effect of a 
producer price decrease in decreasing expected peasant sector 
demand in (2') is magnified. The [S, Ps*] function 
consequently is flatter than in figure 1, since the reduction 
producer price called for by larger stock positions
nondingly has fallen. At a given producer price, the 
.lity that domestic demand Q^t will exceed domestic 
.y Qst is greater than in figure 1, so there is greater 
eentive to insure against imports by holding a larger reserve
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Producer Price
(1986 Z$/ton)
Figure 3. Board's optimal producer prices and reserve stocks given 
augmented wholesale wheat price, Zimbabwe.
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stock. Locus [Ps , S*] thus shifts upward and to the right. 
Optimal reserve stock is S* = 175,000 tons, up from the zero 
reserve optimal when wheat price is at its 1986-87 level 
(figure 1). Optimal producer price is Ps* = Z$100/ton, down 
from Z$130/ton in the 1986-87 wheat price scenario.
PRIVATE VERSUS SOCIALLY OPTIMAL POLICY
Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Board's actual maize reserves on 
March 31, 1986, adjusted for working stocks needed to 
compensate for farm supply seasonality, were 1,226,000 
tons.Ul/ Producer price on that date was z$180/ton. This 
stock-price combination is plotted at point C in figure 2, 
where it clearly differs from the point (A) considered most 
desirable on basis of the figure 2 analysis. Examination of 
the difference reveals the multiplicity of factors government 
takes into account when setting agricultural policy.
Deviation between actual producer price and the one 
determined in figure 2 as privately optimal to the board is 
vertical distance BE. The implied policy discrepancy is much 
greater than this, however, since if stocks are at 1,226,000 
tons, optimal price is DF; true discrepancy between current and 
privately optimal price is distance CD. The board pays farmers 
a great deal more per ton than it would if it were acting as an 
expected utility maximizing monopsonist.
The most likely reason is that price policy has responded 
to a broader goal than maximization of the marketing board's 
welfare. Expected producer surplus always rises with producer 
price increases, and although variance of surplus rises as well 
(see analysis below equation 4'), producers' expected utility
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should improve with price increases given typical risk aversion 
levels. In their capacity as consumers, peasant farmers also 
gain from a higher producer price because it encourages them to 
sell maize and purchase retail maize meal, stimulating retail 
demand and increasing consumer surplus associated with a given 
retail price. Producers and peasant farm consumers thus form a 
natural lobbying front in favor of higher producer prices. 
Governments that have maintained low farm prices effectively 
have resisted this pressure in deference to the interests of 
their marketing board accounts. That is, they have imputed to 
the farming industry a low weight in the social welfare 
function (Pollard and Graham).llj
The second form of discrepancy revealed by figure 2 is that 
if price is maintained at Z$180/ton, a reserve stock of 
1,226,000 tons (length BC) is far higher than optimal given the 
intermediate risk aversion assumed. Optimum reserve in fact is 
zero, indicated by point B on figure 2's [Ps, S*] line. 
Difference BC is not likely explained by producer or consumer 
political pressure or by a welfare function that includes 
producer or consumer interests. Grain reserves immediately 
affect the mean and stability only of marketing board returns 
because domestic prices usually are fixed on an annual basis. 
Assuming policy makers are effective optimizers, a more 
plausible reason for the discrepancy is that risk aversion, 
mean exchange rate, or random variable probabilities we have 
employed differ from those policy makers actually have used.
These possibilities are examined in table 2 and figure 4a, 
which give estimated probability moments and cumulative 
frequency distributions of board income at 1986-87 domestic 
prices for a zero and 1,226,000-ton reserve stock. Income
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Table 2. Prospects facing board with 1986-87 maize and other 
prices intact £/
Actual Reserve Optimal Reserve
Stock, 3/31/86 Stock, 3/31/86 &/
Reserve Stock 1,226 0
(000 tons)
Expected Net
Domestic Supply 622.91 622.91
(000 tons) £/
Chance of Imports (%) 4.4 8.1
Expected Income (000 Z$) 32,820 44,389
Standard Deviation of 291,382 113,392
Income (000 Z$)
Income Skew j|/ 0.08 0.25
a/ Producer, wholesale (domestic selling), and retail meal prices 
are Z$180.00, 222.00, and 381.22/ton, respectively, 
b/ Assumes government is intermediately risk averse on Binswanger's 
scale.
c/ Expected domestic supply less expected domestic demand, 
d/ Skewness statistic is third central moment of income divided by 
the cube of the standard deviation.
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Cumulative 
Probability (%)
(b) Foreign Exchange Earnings (million 1986 Z$)
Figure 4. Cumulative probability distributions of marketing board incone 
and foreign exchange earnings, zero-stock and large-stock 
policies, Zimbabwe. a/
a/ Figure assumes all prices are at 1986-87 levels.
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associated with a zero stock has higher mean, lower variance, 
and more positive skew than does income with a 1,226,000-ton 
reserve. For risk averters with nonincreasingly risk averse 
utility functions, each of these differences favors the 
zero-stock policy (Tsaing, pp. 356-9 ). 1A/ More importantly, 
the zero-stock distribution's left tail in figure 4a lies well 
to the right of that of the 1,226,000-ton-stock distribution, 
indicating the zero stock is associated with lower 
probabilities of large losses. Because at any income level the 
area under the zero-stock cumulative probability distribution 
is smaller than that under the large-stock distribution, zero 
stock dominates the 1,226,000-ton stock in the second degree 
and is preferred to the latter by all risk averters (Anderson, 
Dillon, and Hardaker, pp. 284-88). If, then, our probability 
and exchange rate assumptions are correct, the board's large 
stockholdings imply policy makers are risk seekers, quite at 
odds with the risk aversion shared by most citizens.
The possibility that the foregoing conclusion results from 
undervaluing foreign exchange is dispelled by figure 4b, which 
gives cumulative distributions of foreign exchange earnings 
under the no-stock and large-stock scenarios. Figure 4b, 
rather than 4a, would interest policy makers if they infinitely 
valued hard over local currency, that is ignored local currency 
costs and revenues. Implications of figure 4b, however, are 
little different from those of 4a. Large maize reserves still 
are associated with the greater chance of a large loss. 
Maintaining the large stock reduces the probability of imports 
only from 8.1% to 4.4%, so the principal effect of the stock is 
to increase exposure to export price risk. Besides this, the 
stocks incur interest charges: mean present value of hard
currency income is US$53,505,000 under the large-stock and 
US$56,693,000 under the zero-stock policy. Holding reserves 
would, of course, have reduced earnings risk if chances of 
imports had been higher.
Finally, policy makers may operate under probability 
assumptions different from those we have been using. Large 
carryover stocks at end of the 1982-83 fiscal year were, in 
hindsight, beneficial because they enabled Zimbabwe to weather 
two succeeding years of drought with minimal imports. But 
fixating on recent events obscures probabilities based on a 
wider range of experience. Chances of an early repetition of 
the 1983-85 yield depression in fact are quite small and serve 
as an inadequate basis for present policy.
IMPACT OF REMOVING SUBSIDIES
A number of countries have begun reducing subsidies on 
consumer staples and, where applicable, taxes on producer 
prices in order to improve domestic resource allocation. 
Eliminating such interventions changes the probability 
distribution of net domestic supply, so marketing boards also 
must reassess reserve stock policy. Complete subsidy and tax 
removal was modelled in this study by setting domestic maize 
selling price equal to expected border price at t (world price 
less transfer cost to port) times expected exchange rate at 
t.H./ Producer price was domestic maize selling price less 
board handling and storage cost, and consumer price was 
domestic selling price plus milling and distribution cost. 
Table 3 shows results assuming alternately that (a) the board 
maintains its present large reserve stock and (b) stocks are 
adjusted to maximize expected utility given intermediate risk
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Table 3. Prospects facing board if maize price subsidies are 
removed £/
Actual Reserve Optimal Reserve
Stock, 3/31/86 Stock, 3/31/86 &/
Reserve Stock 
(000 tons)
1,226 0
Expected Net 
Domestic Supply 
(000 tons) £/
919.14 919.14
Chance of Imports (%) 4.3 5.3
Expected Income (000 z$) 9,002 22,273
Standard Deviation of 
Income (000 Z$)
336,264 153,049
Income Skew £/ 0.01 0.01
a/ Assuming an exchange rate of z$2.25/US$, nonsubsidized producer, 
wholesale, and retail price are Z$227.22, 271.84, and 410.90/ton, 
respectively. At the officialexchange rate of Z$1.66/US$, the 
prices are z$156.66, 201.28, and 340.34/ton, respectively. A 
Z$2.25/US$ rate was used in this table.
b/ c/ d/ See footnotes under table 2.
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aversion. The optimal adjustment again is to eliminate reserve 
stocks altogether.
At an approximately equilibrating exchange rate of 
z$2.25/US$, full-cost pricing would increase producer, 
wholesale, and retail prices. Thus, producers presently are 
taxed and consumers subsidized relative to border prices. The 
net effect of these price changes is to reduce the expectation, 
raise the variance, and reduce the skew of board income 
(compare tables 2 and 3). If the board had well-behaved 
(decreasingly risk averse) utility, it clearly would be worse 
off on all counts. Extent of the expected loss is about the 
same whether the large-stock or optimal (zero-stock) policy is 
maintained. One way, therefore, to cushion the impact on the 
Zimbabwe government of price policy reforms is to reduce 
reserve stocks.
The conclusion that the hoard would suffer from full-cost 
pricing seems counter to the usual notion that such pricing 
would help rid boards of chronic financial losses. Actually, 
there is no conflict between these two ideas. Accounting 
losses typically are based on official exchange rates that 
understate the social value of foreign exchange and therefore 
of exports. In export surplus years, the board's official net 
returns thus understate social returns. For the same reason, 
'full-cost' producer prices based on official exchange rates 
typically would be too low relative to export value. Because 
they often also are lower than producer prices currently in 
force, switching to an official 'full-cost' price tends to 
improve a board's accounting returns.
To illustrate this, solutions in tables 2 and 3 were rerun
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using as a mean exchange cate the October 1986 average official 
rate of Z$1.66/US$. Expected board income with 1986-87 prices 
intact (corresponding to table 2) fell to -Z$6,029,000 given 
the 1,226,000-ton reserve and to Z$1,043,000 given a zero 
reserve. Standard deviations fell to Z$166,766,000 and 
Z$63,725,000, and skew coefficients to 0.02 and -0.12, 
respectively. 'Pull cost' pricing at the official exchange 
reduced producer, wholesale, and retail prices below current 
levels (see footnote a of tables 2 and 3). Corresponding mean 
income, again using the official exchange rate, was only 
Z$6,793,000 given a 1,226,000-ton reserve (compared to the 
Z$9,002,000 in table 3) and only Z$10,270,000 given a zero 
reserve. Thus, whatever the stock level, mean accounting 
income at the official exchange rate rises when taxes and 
subsidies are removed. Reverting to an approximately 
equilibrating mean rate not only adjusts incomes to more 
accurate, higher levels but shows that producer prices actually 
rise and board incomes fall under full-cost pricing.il/ Net 
social welfare change depends upon the weight assigned 
producers' gains relative to government's losses.
CONCLUSIONS
A framework has been set out in this paper for evaluating 
the impact on a government marketing board of selected price 
and reserve stock policies. We have argued that impacts should 
be addressed ex ante in terms of the expected utilities of 
alternative policies. This involves assessing not just 
expected effects or likelihoods of arbitrarily defined 
disasters, but the entire probability distributions of random 
returns. Using this approach, optimal price and reserve stock
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levels were found to be interdependent. Producer price ideal 
from government's viewpoint depends upon the board's 
stockholdings and vice versa. At 1986-87 prices, Zimbabwe's 
optimal reserve (i.e. that net of working requirements) would 
be zero unless account were taken of the riskiness of import 
transfer cost. When the latter is considered, optimal reserve 
is only 105,000 tons. Larger reserves would be desirable if 
demand-stimulating wholesale prices were adopted.
Socially optimal prices are likely to be higher than those 
indicated in figures 1 through 3 because government must keep 
consumer and producer as well as marketing board interests in 
mind. However, with producer prices presently in force, the 
high reserve stocks maintained in Zimbabwe imply policy makers 
either are prone to take unusually large financial risks or 
dwell excessively on the recent drought experience. Given 
empirically validated risk aversion and import probability 
assumptions, the board's stocks are much too large to maximize 
expected utility. Allowing for differences in assumed 
objectives, this agrees with Pollard and Graham's conclusion 
(p. 1074) that Jamaican export marketing boards are 
'inefficient both in terms of the maximization of their own 
profits and the maximization of foreign exchange earnings.'
The effect of removing subsidies or taxes from domestic 
prices depends crucially on the exchange rate used to convert 
world prices to a domestic equivalent. At official Zimbabwe 
dollar - U.S. dollar rates, producer prices are subsidized and 
wholesale and retail prices taxed relative to world prices.A^/ 
Removing these interventions would increase the expectation of 
the marketing board's accounting income. But official exchange 
rates do not reflect the true scarcity value of hard currency.
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When a rate closer to equilibrating level is used, producer 
prices are taxed and wholesale and consumer prices subsidized 
relative to world price. Removing the latter interventions 
would reduce government's mean income and expected utility 
while improving producer welfare.
In the bleaker world in which government would find itself 
with full-cost pricing, there would be incentives to share 
grain marketing functions with other firms. Market sharing 
would shift to other equity-holders some of the enormous risks 
presently saddling government marketing efforts (see figure 4). 
Inter-firm competition also would help provide information on 
equilibrium prices necessary for determining true minimum 
costs, which in turn are needed for identifying the incidence 
of taxes and subsidies. Market decontrol thus is a natural 
consequent of, as well as requirement for, true full-cost 
pricing. Analysis of the likely impacts of decontrol would 
require additional information on the grain marketing costs 
that would be incurred by new firms.
it
319
1. Strategic reserves are distinguished from working stocks held due 
to the seasonal nature of the board's domestic maize purchases. 
Terms 'reserve stock' or 'stock' in this chapter refer to such 
strategic reserves.
2. Because they tend to be stable in deflated terms, costs H, I, and 
F are assumed known at t-1.
3. To render comparable the mean square errors of doublelog and 
linear fits, the latter must be multiplied by the squared inverse 
of the dependent variable's geometric mean (Box and Cox).
4. We are indebted to Kay Leresche for pointing out the rural 
security effect on food supplies.
5. As Pollard and Graham point out (p. 1068), actual benefits to 
citizens depend upon how board losses are financed or how profits 
are distributed. We assume losses or profits are distributed 
broadly in some ma iner but do not venture to measure the effect of 
alternative distribution schemes.
6. Exponential utility is U = - exp(-mY), where Y is income and m is 
constant absolute risk aversion. Use of a decreasing absolute 
risk aversion function made little difference to the study's 
results and is not reported here.
7. Random variables esit, eS2t were assumed normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance derived from (3'),
(4'). Variable e^t was lognormally distributed with mean 
one and variance taken from (2'). World price Pwt was 
normally distributed with mean and variance derived from
NOTES
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its 1972-84 trend line. Variance of exchange rate Xt was 
derived from its 1980-85 trend but mean set at Z$2.25/US$. 
The latter is above official levels (Z$1.66/US$ in October 
1986) but near what is commonly thought to be an 
equilibrating rate (Financial Gazette, p. 4.).
8. The additional argument that stocks 'save the foreign 
exchange cost of importing' assumes implicitly that hard 
currency is worth more than its official rate.
9. Certainty equivalent cost is expected cost plus risk 
premium, where the latter is a positive function of cost 
variance and the decision maker's risk aversion (Pratt, pp. 
124-5).
10. Total fiscal-year-end stocks were 1,426,000 tons. The 
board's monthly net maize intake is negative until early 
July, when cumulative maize purchases begin to exceed 
cumulative domestic sales. We have assumed liberally that 
a four-month working stock is needed at 50,000 tons per 
month, so the effective strategic reserve on March 31 was 
1,226,000 tons.
11. Pollard and Graham (p. 1068) note that when boards act as 
expected profit maximizers, this 'may reduce the potential 
benefits to society, depending on the state of the social 
welfare function.'
12. Increasing risk aversion is regarded by many as 
unreasonable because it implies an individual would be 
increasingly unwilling to bear a risk of fixed size as his 
income increased.
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13. Deducting transfer cost from, rather than adding it to, 
world price assumes the board expects to export rather than 
import at time t. This is justified by subsequent results 
and by Zimbabwe's typically export position. If policy 
makers have rational expectations, disposition of transfer 
cost is endogenous because it must be consistent with the 
mean solution obtained.
14. Full-cost prices of imported farm inputs also would rise if 
the exchange rate employed to determine them were increased 
from official to equilibrating levels.
15. Also using official exchange rates, Jabara (pp. 616-17) 
found maize prices in Kenya to be roughly in line with 
world prices, hence neither taxed nor subsidized.
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